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JURISDICTION TO TAX INTANGIBLESI
EDWARD S. STIMSON
Inability to think realistically about so-called intangible property has re-
sulted in a decision which seems unfortunate. A necromantic use of terms
has resulted in an opinion which defies understanding. First Bank Stock
Corporation v. State of Minnesota2 recently decided by the United States
Supreme Court, involves the question of what state or states may tax corpo-
rate stock. The problem presented by the-facts is a complicated one. Stock
in Montana and North Dakota state banks was owned by a Delaware cor-
poration which did business in Minnesota. Its headquarters were there and
the certificates of stock in the subsidiary banks were kept there. Montana
had taxed the stock of its banks and so had North Dakota. Minnesota taxed
the same stock. The District Court of Hennepin County, Minnesota, held
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the
imposition of the tax by Minnesota. The Minnesota Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion. It is sub-
mitted that the District Court was right.
The word "property" is peculiarly ambiguous. When used to refer
to ownership of a tangible object or person such as an automobile or a
slave, it is thought of as designating the object or person. When used to
indicate the ownership of a debt owed by an individual, it is thought of as
meaning the legal relation. In these relationships the debtor is as tangible
as the slave or automobile and the legal relation between slave and owner
or automobile and owner is as intangible as the legal relation between
a debtor and his creditor. For jurisdictional purposes there is no difference
between tangible pioperty and intangible property and courts and writers
ought not to allow themselves to be carried away by this popular classification.
If a tangible object or person like an automobile or slave is in one state's
territory and its or his owner is in the territory of another, the state in whose
territory the object or person. is can compel payment of a tax because it can
seize the object or person and either hold it or him until the tax is paid or
sell it or him thereby cutting off the rights of the foreign owner. Likewise
if a debtor is in the territory of one state and his creditor is in another's ter-
ritory the state, having power over the debtor, can compel payment of a tax
because it can compel the debtor to pay a portion of the debt to it; and
since the debtor is subject to its law it can give him a pro tanto discharge
from his duty to the foreign creditor.3 The extent of the debtor's duty
'For convenience, the name STImSoN is used in the footnotes to designate the
writer's JURISDICTION AND POWER OF TAXATION published in 1933.
257 Sup. Ct. 677 (April 26, 1937).
'See infra note 25.
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'depends on the law to which he is subject and it necessarily determines the
extent of the foreign creditor's right. The property right is wholly within
the control of the state having power over the debtor. That is why a debt
may be attached, garnisheed, or subjected to trustee process in the state in
which the debtor is served with process, for that state, having power over
the debtor, can discharge him from the duty to his foreign creditor on pay-
ment of the money into court, even though subsequently the court orders the
money paid to plaintiff, the creditor's creditor.4
If the debtor is a corporation, it is a legal entity which is intangible and
has no location in space. Nevertheless, it has always been recognized that
the corporation is subject to the power of the state in which it is incorpo-
rated.5 It follows that the state which has power over the corporation can
compel it to pay a tax on the debt because it can compel payment of a portion
,of the debt to it and can discharge the corporation pro tanto from its duty
'to the foreign creditor.
Corporate stock is a legal relation between a corporation and a stock-
holder in which the corporation is the obligor and the stockholder is the
obligee. As with debt, the state which has power over the corporate obligor
can compel it to pay a tax on the stock because it can compel payment of a
'part of the value of the stock to it thereby diminishing the value of the
shares including those owned by foreign stockholders. Also it can compel
the foreign owner to pay the tax by prohibiting the corporation from
transferring shares on its books until the tax is paid.
Realistically, a state having power over a debtor or issuing corporation
is as able to exact a tax as a state having power over a tangible object or a
slave. Jurisdiction to tax is the same for "tangible" and "intangible" property.
The state having power over the property can tax it.6 So, too, can the state
which has power over the owner, creditor, or stockholder.7 By physical sua-
'Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710 (1899) ; Harris
v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1904); Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Deer, 200 U. S.
176 (1906). For state court decisions, see STIMSON, p. 25, n. 53.
6 STIMSON, pp. 11-12.
eCredits: New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899); Bristol v. Washington
County, 177 U. S. 133 (1900) ; State Board of Assessors of Parish of Orleans v. Comp-
toir National D'Escompte, 191 U. S. 388 (1903); Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189
(1903) (overruled; see infra note 21) ; Scottish Union & National Insurance Co. v.
Bowland, 196 U. S. 611 (1905) ; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 205
"U. S. 395 (1907); Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Orleans Assessors,
221 U. S. 346 (1911). For state court decisions see STIAsor, p. 25, n. 54.
Stock: Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall. 490 (1873) ; Corry v. Balti-
more, 196 U. S. 466 (1905). For state court decisions see STIMSON, p. 24, n. 52.
'Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879); Bonaparte v. Appeal Tax Court,
104 U. S. 592 (1881); Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1 (1913); Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54 (1917); Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks
County, N. D., 253 U. S. 325 (1920) ; Citizen's National Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99
(1921); Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U. S. 88 (1923). For state court decisions see
STIMsoN p. 10, n. 20.
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sion or other pressures it can compel him to pay a tax measured by the
value of his property 'herever situated. In the absence of constitutional
limitations, when an owner is subject to the power of one state and the
object he owns, his debtor, or issuing corporation is subject to the power
of another, both states can tax.
In a long line of cases beginning with Louisville and Jeffersonville Ferry
Co. v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court has held that double taxation resulting
from taxes imposed by two states of the United States, both of which had
power to tax was so unfair, that it was a violation of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 This compelled it to decide which of the
two states able to exact a tax might still continue to do so. In the case of
"tangible" personal property it decided that the state where the object was
could continue to tax it and the state in whose territory the owner was
could no longer continue to do so.9 It recognized that the old maxim,
mobilia sequuntur personam, was a fiction which did not express a reason
for the result reached. In the matter of taxing "intangible" property it
has changed its mind several times and now seems to be relying upon the
discredited maxim.
In Louisville and Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky,' ° it held that
Kentucky could not tax ferry franchises granted by Indiana to a Kentucky
corporation. This is a decision in favor of the state having power over the
obligor arid against the state having power over the owner. After this case
there is a period during which the Supreme Court refused to apply the due
process limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment to "intangible" property."
In Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,'2 decided in 1930, the
Supreme Court held that the due process clause of, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibited more than one state of the United States from taxing
"intangible" property. The principle was applied four months later in Bald-
'Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385 (1903) ; Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341 (1905) ; Union Refriger-
ator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905) ; Ludwig v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 216 U. S. 146 (1910) ; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56 (1910);
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 (1910); Looney v. Crane Co.,
245 U. S. 178 (1917); Locomobile Co. of America v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 146
(1918) ; International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135 (1918); Frick v.
Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925) ; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S.
83 (1929) ; Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930) ; Baldwin
v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282
U. S. 1 (1930); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931);.
First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
'Delaware, Lackavanna & Western Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341
(1905) ; Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
"188 U. S. 385 (1903).
'Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1 (1914) ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville,
Ky., 245 U. S. 54 (1917); Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, N. D., 253
U. S. 325 (1920); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1923) (inheritance tax);
Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928) (inheritance tax).
1280 U. S. 204 (1930).
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win v. Missouri,'3 and later in the same year in Beidler v. South Carolina Tax
Commission.14 In these three cases the property consisted of credits. In
First National Bank of Boston v. Maine,15 the principle was applied to cor-
porate stock. The application of the due process principle to so-called in-
tangible property is sound but it is submitted that the Court in deciding which
of the two states might continue to tax chose the wrong state. It decided in
favor of the state having power over the owner, relying on the mobilia
sequuntur personam maxim which it had repudiated in cases where the
property taxed was "tangible."
In all four of these cases the tax imposed was an inheritance tax. Apart
from the constitutional limitation only one state is actually able to exact
an inheritance tax, for, after the death of the owner, the state which had
power over him can no longer force him to pay. This is shown by Colorado
v. Harbeck.'8 The facts in this case were as follows: The deceased died
domiciled in Colorado owning credits and stock valued at $3,000,000. Debtors
and issuing corporations were not subject to Colorado law and there was
no other property in Colorado. Colorado attempted to collect an inheritance
tax but found itself unable to do so because neither the property nor the
legatees were within its power. It sued the New York executrix and the
legatees in New York, which apparently had power over some or all of the
property. The New York Court of Appeals held that Colorado did not have
jurisdiction to tax because neither the property nor any person having a
claim to it was within its power.
In the situation prescribed by the facts in the case above, it is clear that
no personal obligation can be imposed on the deceased and that as between
the state which had power over the deceased owner and the state having power
over the res, obligor, or issuing corporation only, the latter is able to collect
a tax. Of course, the state which had power over the deceased owner could
subject local property to the payment of a tax on foreign property, but this
could be justified only on the untenable ground that the tax was a personal
obligation of the decedent. The domicile theory of jurisdiction does not
represent reality and it has been shown to be unsound.17 The domiciliary
state has no real power over a person beyond its borders, and Colorado v.
Harbeck shows that the magic word "domicile" cannot give it power over a
deceased person.
judge Gray saw this, and his dissenting opinion in Matter of Swift,'8
which was the first case on the point in this country, is still one of the best
=281 U. S. 586 (1930).1282 U. S. 1 (1930).
1z284 U. S. 312 (1932).
10232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921).
"See Sec. II of the writer's article "What Law Governs" to appear soon.
8137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096 (1893).
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expositions of the problem. In this case the New York Court of Appeals
upheld an inheritance tax assessed by New York on chattels situated out-
side of the state on the ground that the decedent was domiciled in the state.
The disposition of judges to prefer authority to reason caused it to be
followed until the United States Supreme Court decision in Frick v. Penn-
sylvania.19 Unfortunately, the supposed difference between "tangible" and
"intangible" property has caused the latter decision to be limited to so-called
tangible property. So, until Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,20
it was assumed that inheritance taxes could be imposed by both the de-
cedent's domiciliary state and the state having power over the debtor or
issuing 'corporation. In this case the selection of the decedent's domiciliary
state as the only state which would be permitted to continue to impose the
tax was, in the first place, the choice of a state which never had actual
power to impose a personal obligation for the tax because control over the
owner ceased when he died, and, in the second place, the choice was incon-
sistent with that made in the decisions on the constitutional limitation on the
power to tax so-called tangible property. In order to make this unsatisfactory
choice, the Supreme Court had to overrule its own decision in Blackstone
v. Miller2 ' and ignore its decision in Louisville and Jeffersonville Ferry Co.
v. Kentucky.2 2 It is submitted that these two decisions must eventually be
followed.
In Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota2 3 and First National Bank
of Boston v. Maine,24 the Supreme Court relied upon State Tax on Foreign
Held Bonds.2 5 Up to the time of these decisions it was the only Supreme
Court decision holding that credits could not be taxed by the state having
power over the debtor. There were a number of Supreme Court decisions
to the contrary besides Blackstone v. Miller.26 The Supreme Court in its
opinion in one of these cases, Bristol v. Washington County,2 quoted from
an opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court28 in which it was said that
Minnesota, where the debtors were, had jurisdiction to tax the credits be-
cause the credits had a business situs in Minnesota. In another and later
case, Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Co. v. Orleans Assessors,2
in which State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds3" was in effect overruled, the
1"268 U. S. 473 (1925).
"280 U. S. 204 (1930), cited supra note 12.
"188 U. S. 189 (1903).
"188 U. S. 385 (1903).
"280 U. S. 204 (1930), cited supra notes 12 and 20.
"284 U. S. 312 (1932), cited supra note 15.
-*15 Wall. 300 (1872).
2"The cases are listed in note 6 supra under the subheading, Credits.
"177 U. S. 133 (1900).
'In re Jefferson, 35 Minn. 215 (1886).
221 U. S. 346 (1911).
15 Wall. 300 (1872), cited supra note 25.
i
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United States Supreme Court repudiated the idea that the jurisdiction of
the state having power over the debtor was based on the business situs
phantasm. Chief justice Hughes said:
"When it is said that intangible property, such as credits on open
account, have their situs at the creditor's domicile the metaphor does
not aid. Being incorporeal they have no actual situs. But they consti-
tute property; as such they must be regarded as taxable, and the question
is one of jurisdiction.
"The legal fiction, expressed in the maxim, mobilia sequu-ntur per-
sonwam, yields to the fact of actual control elsewhere. And in the case
of credits, though intangible, arising as did those in the present instance,
the control adequate to confer jurisdiction may be found in the sover-
eignty of the debtor's domicile. The debt, of course, is not property in
the hands of the debtor; but it is an obligation of the debtor and is of
value to the creditor because he may be compelled to pay; and power
over the debtor at his domicile is control of the ordinary means of en-
forcement." 3'
Unable to ignore these cases entirely, the Supreme Court in Farmer's
Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesotas2 and First National Bank of Boston v.
Maine3s said that intangibles might acquire a situs for taxation other than
at the domicile of their owner "if they have become integral parts of some
local business. '3 4 Apparently the Supreme Court meant that if a business
situs could be established, the state of the situs could tax and not the domi-
ciliary state. The term business situs never had a definite meaning. The
presence of an agent of the creditor in the state where the debtors were is
not always sufficient to establish it.3 5 In the opinions in which it appears,
the term is used as a device to get around the unfortunate decision in
State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds.3 s
The Court applied the choice made in the inheritance tax cases to an
annual property tax in Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., Inc.,37 decided
in 1934. Here Virginia had imposed the disputed tax on accounts receivable
arising out of business done in Ohio owned by a corporation incorporated
and having its principal place of business in Virginia. What state or states
had power over the debtors does not appear. The Supreme Court sustained
the tax on the ground that Virginia was the "domicile" of the corporation.
There are at least three difficulties with this argument. (1) Domicile never
was a basis of jurisdiction for the imposition of taxes other than inheritance
a'221 U. S. 346 at 354 (1911).
2280 U. S. 204 (1930), cited supra notes 12, 20 and 23.
='284 U. S. 312 (1932), cited supra notes 15 and 24.
31280 U. S. 204, 213 (1930) ; 284 U. S. 312, 331 (1934).
'Reat v. People, 201 Ill. 469, 66 N. E. 242 (1903); Hillman Land & Iron Co. v_
Commonwealth, 148 Ky. 331, 338, 146 S. W. 776, 780 (1912); Adams v. Mortgage Co.,
82 Miss. 263, 392, 34 So. 482, 528 (1903) ; Herron v. Keeran, 59 Ind. 472 (1872).
w15 Wall. 300 (1872). See STIAISON, p. 24 et seq.
w293 U. S. 15 (1934).
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taxes.8s (2) Domicile never was a basis of jurisdiction over corporations8 9
and it is inapplicable because of the rule that there can be only one legal
domicile,40 while a corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of all states or
countries in which it has agents or servants acting or "doing business" for
it,41 in addition to the state or country in which it is incorporated. (3) No
corporation has a "home" 42 in the sense that the word is used in connection
with individuals. Therefore, the word "domicile" is used figuratively to
designate something else, which leads to the question: What else? In the
Virginia case it seems to mean state of incorporation.
In Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox4 8 the facts were similar to those in
Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co.,44 except that the corporation was in-
corporated in one state, Delaware, and the office from which its affairs were
managed was in another, West Virginia. As in the Virginia case, the "in-
tangible" property consisted of credits or claims against debtors but to what
law the. debtors were subject does not appear. The bank deposits were ap-
parently in banks whose banking houses were in other states, and if these
banks were corporations incorporated in those states they might be con-
sidered to be foreign corporations doing business in West Virginia by
reason of the deposits and withdrawals made by the Wheeling Steel Cor-
poration from Wheeling, and subject to West Virginia law. The Supreme
Court sustained an ad valorem property tax imposed on this property by
West Virginia. Chief Justice Hughes said:
"To attribute to Delaware, merely as the chartering state, the credits
arising in the course of the business established in another state, and to
deny to the latter the power to tax such credits upon the ground that
it violates due process to treat the credits as within its jurisdiction, is
to make a legal fiction dominate realities in a fashion quite as extreme
as that which would attribute to the chartering state all the tangible
possessions of the Corporation without regard to their actual location.
45
This statement should be applauded.
What are the "realities"? It was said that West Virginia was the com-
mercial domicile46 of the corporation. Since it is unreal to attribute a domi-
cile to a corporation it is difficult to see how the addition of the word
'STimsoN, p. 6, n. 11.
'STIMSON, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1933) 18 ST. Louis L. REv. 195.
'GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws (1927) § 14.
'Supra note 39.
"'Supra note 40.
3298 U. S. 193 (1936). See also Smith v. Ajax Pipe Line Co., 87 F. (2d) 567
(C. C. A. 8th 1936), cert. denied 57 Sup. Ct. 670 (1937). In this case a tax imposed by
Missouri on a Delaware corporation's bank deposit in a New York bank was sustained.
The corporation was doing business in Missouri and its principal office was there.
"Supra note 37.
"298 U. S. 193 at 211 (1936).
-See Ramsey, A New Theory of Corporate Domicile for Tax Purposes (1937) 23
A. B. A. J. 543.
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"commercial" is a recognition of reality. The accounts receivable were
said to have a situs in West Virginia because: (1) the books were kept
there; (2) the accounts were payable there; and (3) the contracts out of
which they arose were made there. The contracts originated with orders
taken in sales offices in other states for goods manufactured and shipped
from other states but as the orders were subject to acceptance or rejection
at the office in West Virginia the contracts were said to be "made" in West
Virginia. Similar reasoning in the case of "tangible" personal property
would be to say that it was taxable where the contract of purchase was com-
pleted although the object was in another state on tax day. The bank de-
posits in banks whose banking houses were in other states were said to
have a situs in West Virginia because "From the Wheeling office proceed
the items deposited and there the withdrawals are directed and controlled."
The meaning of the case is obscure. The Court may have intended to put
the decision .on the ground that the credits had a situs in West Virginia
because the "domicile" of the corporation was there, "domicile" being inter-
preted to mean the place from which the corporation is managed. On the
other hand it may have wanted to base the decision on the ground that the
credits had a business situs in West Virginia, although the debtors were not
subject to West Virginia law. Whatever was meant neither precedent nor
reason supports it.
The principal case, First Bank Stock Corporation v. State of Minnesota,4T
is an application of the doctrines of Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Fox4 8
to corporate stock. The Minnesota tax was sustained on both grounds, to
wit: that Minnesota was the commercial domicile of the owning corporation
and that the stock of the Montana and North Dakota corporations had a
business situs in Minnesota. The criticism of these beautiful word com-
binations is equally applicable here. In addition this is the first application
of the business situs phantasm to corporate stock. The presence of the stock
certificates in Minnesota did not give it power over the property because
the certificates like bonds and notes are merely evidence of the legal relation,
and the state in whose territory they are located does not because of them
have power over the legal relation so as to be able to exact a tax.49
Would not the following be a sound solution of the problem presented
by the facts in First Bank Stock Corporation v. Minnesota? The due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits more than one state
of the United States from taxing "intangibles" as well as "tangibles." Of
the several states having actual power only the state having power over the
'
TSupra note 2.
"Supra note 43.
"Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930) and cases cited
in STiusoN, p. 33, n. 77.
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debtor or issuing corporation may continue to tax. Stock of the corporations
incorporated and doing business in Montana may be taxed there only. Stock
-of the corporations incorporated and doing business in North Dakota may be
taxed by it only. The Minnesota tax was invalid because prohibited by the
-due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
If the obligor or issuing corporation was one over which several states
had power, the best solution would seem to be to permit each state to tax
a proportionate part of the debt or stock based on the ratio of the value
,of the corporation's real and tangible personal property situated within the
state to the total value of its real and tangible personal property.50
'See the following inheritance tax cases: Matter of Cooley, 186 N. Y. 220, 78 N. E.
939 (1906); Matter of Thayer, 193 N. Y. 430, 86 N. E. 462 (1908); Kingsbury v.
Chapin, 196 Mass. 533, 82 N. E. 700 (1907) ; Gardiner v. Carter, 74 N. H. 507, 69 Atl.
939 (1908). See also, STIMsoN, p. 48.
